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AFFIRMING AMBIGUITY: REEVES V
SANDERSON PLUMBING PROD UCTS, INC. AND
THE BURDEN-SHIFTING FRAMEWORK OF
DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 makes it illegal for an
employer to discriminate in the workplace on the basis of race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin.2  However, since the passage of the
Act in 1964, lawyers, jurists, and commentators have asked: How do
affected employees produce persuasive evidence of discrimination?3
Undoubtedly, the most persuasive evidence of unlawful discrimination
is direct proof of the employer's discriminatory motivation.4 Direct
evidence of discrimination, however, is difficult to produce and rarely
arises in contemporary disparate treatment litigation.5 This difficulty of
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994). According to Justice White, Title VII "was designed
to remedy the intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the employer and the unions
from certain job categories." Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) ("Without a job,
one cannot afford public convenience and accommodations. Income from employment may
be necessary to further a man's education, or that of his children.") (quoting Sen. Humphrey,
110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2(a) (1994).
3. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, Separate
Minority Views of Hon. Richard H. Poff and Hon. William Cramer, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2477;
Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After
I-icks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507,523 (1995); Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff
Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination if She Cannot Explore the Relevant
Circumstances: The Need for Broad Workforce and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV.
U. L. REV. 159 (1996).
4. For example, an employer saying, "I am firing you because you are black and I don't
like blacks" would be extremely persuasive direct evidence. Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415,
448 (2000); Michael Evan Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of Employment
Discrimination, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 181 (2001) (noting that such egregious
discriminatory comments are rare).
5. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 1996); Gates v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397,399 (D. Or. 1970); 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 8.01[1], at 8-7 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that "[e]mployers are, on the whole,
too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper.., before witnesses"); see also Brief of
Amici Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. at 13 n.10, Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 113 (2000) (No. 99-536), available at
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-court/docket/mardocket.htm#99-536 (last visited
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producing evidence has consequently forced prosecuting employees to
prove their claims with indirect evidence of discrimination.
To assist the producers of indirect discriminatory evidence, the
United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green6
articulated an evidentiary framework riddled with presumptions and
shifting production burdens.7 Specifically, the McDonnell Douglas
framework allows an aggrieved plaintiff to demonstrate discrimination
by (1) establishing a prima facie case, and in most instances,' (2) proving
the employer's proffered reasons for its behavior are false and
therefore, a pretext for a discriminatory motive In the years since the
McDonnell Douglas decision, the Supreme Court has attempted to
refine and clarify the evidentiary framework. Yet, in the course of
attempting to refine this framework, the Court's decisions have created
additional ambiguities in the following two discrete, yet interrelated,
areas: (1) the amount of evidence needed to sustain a discriminatory
cause of action and (2) the application of discriminatory evidence to the
federal courts' dispositional procedural devices."
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,1 the Supreme
Court again attempted to clarify and refine the ambiguities that
remained from the Court's preceding jurisprudence. The Court
addressed two central issues. The first issue, which concerned the
significance of a plaintiff's evidence of pretext, was as follows: is credible
June 29, 2001) [hereinafter Lawyers' Committee Brief] (collecting cases that acknowledge
direct evidence of discrimination is difficult to prove).
6. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by."); see infra notes
23-42 and accompanying text.
8. Once a Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a rebuttable
presumption is established. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981).
If the defendant produces no evidence to rebut the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff. Id. However, disposition of a case in this manner is rare.
9. Pretext is defined as "[a] false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual
or strong reason or motive." BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1206 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly,
in disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff is trying to prove that the employer's reason is a
"pretext" for discrimination. A plaintiff "can prove pretext indirectly by showing that (1)
defendant's explanation had no basis in fact, (2) the explanation was not the real reason, or
(3) the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the adverse employment action." HENRY H.
PERRiTr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE § 6.06[A], at 361 (3d ed. 2001).
10. "Dispositional procedural devices" mean a court's application of summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 50. FED. R.
Civ. P. 50, 56.
11. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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proof of pretext, by itself, enough to sustain a favorable jury decision?"
Second, the Court sought to refine the standards for considering
evidence when deciding a motion for a judgment as a matter of law.13
Nonetheless, while it discussed the standards for pretext evidence, the
Reeves Court ironically cultivated another split between the circuit
courts of appeals. Thus, the practical effect of Reeves has been
negligible.
This Comment compares and contrasts the evidentiary framework
for disparate treatment cases"' before and after the Court's recent
decision in Reeves. Section II will review the Supreme Court's
development of an evidentiary framework for disparate treatment cases
and the resulting ambiguities. Section III will analyze the Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., in which the Court attempted, but failed, to clarify the pre-Reeves
ambiguities. Section IV will discuss the conflicting interpretations of
Reeves in the lower federal courts. Section V advocates a uniform
standard consistent with the policies underlying the McDonnell Douglas
framework and summary judgment procedure. Finally, Section VI
provides a summary and conclusion to the Comment.
II. THE HISTORICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The McDonnell Douglas Three-step Analysis
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act allows the plaintiff to prove
discrimination through evidence of either disparate impact or disparate
treatment.15 In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff attempts to provethat a "facially neutral" employment practice has a discriminatory effect
12. See id. at 137.
13. See id. This refinement also applied to summary judgment proceedings. I& at'150.
14. The term "disparate treatment cases" normally includes claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994); 1 MERRICK T. RossEiN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2, at 2-4 to 2-5 (1990). However, the evidentiary
requirements of Reeves and its predecessors also extend, nearly identically, to claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and section 510 of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 & nn.24-26, 28 (3d ed. 1996); 2 ROSSEIN, supra, §
22.5, at 22-27, § 24.1[1], at 24-5. Cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 ("Because the parties do not
dispute the issue, we shall assume, arguendo, that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully
applicable here.").
15. See LEE MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1.6, at 15 (2d ed.
1988).
2001]
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on a protected class.16 Accordingly, courts focus on the discriminatory
results of an employer's action.17
In contrast, a disparate treatment case focuses not on the
discriminatory results, but rather on the employer's discriminatory
motivation."8 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
the Supreme Court summarized disparate treatment as follows: "The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because
of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical. . . .. '9 Direct proof of discriminatory
motive, however, is very difficult for plaintiffs to produce.2" This
difficulty extends from the subjective nature of discriminatory practices2
and the fact that any documentation indicating discrimination is usually
under the employer's control2
In order to lessen the difficult burden on plaintiffs to produce direct
evidence, the Supreme Court developed an evidentiary framework
designed to make circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a
disparate treatment claim.3 The Court introduced this framework in
McDonnell Douglas, where the plaintiff brought suit under Title VII
alleging that he was not hired by the aerospace company because "of his
race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement." 24 The
16. Id. § 1.6, at 16; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Congress
[requires] the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.").
17. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 81; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432 ("Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.").
18. MODJESKA, supra note 15, § 1.6, at 15.
19. 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983) ("There will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to the employer's mental processes.")
(inner quotations omitted).
22. MODJESKA, supra note 15, § 1.7, at 17. Other logical reasons for the difficulty of
producing direct evidence include the lack of contemporaneous witnesses to the harassment
and co-workers who do not testify because they fear losing their own job. Interview with Lisa
C. Paul, employment law attorney, Croen & Barr LLP, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Jan. 25,2001).
23. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1973); PERRITT,
supra note 9, § 6.06[A], at 359-60; see also Jody H. O'Dell, Comment, Between Pretext Only
and Pretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and its Application to
Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1994) (noting that after
McDonnell Douglas, "[the plaintiff] must rely upon indirect or circumstantial evidence to
prove discrimination").
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
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Court granted certiorari "[ijn order to clarify the standards governing
the disposition of [the Title VII] action."'  Ultimately, the Court's
clarification developed into an "elaborate three-stage, burden-shifting
framework" complete with presumptions and production burdens.26
The McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework first requires the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.'
For instance, a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)8 is established by
proving the following: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class protected
by the ADEA, i.e. she is at least 40 years of age;29 (2) the plaintiff was
otherwise qualified for the position of employment; (3) the plaintiff
was discharged by the employer-defendant;31 and, (4) the employer-
defendant replaced the plaintiff!' After the plaintiff establishes this
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence,33 a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination exists.4
In order to rebut the presumption created by a prima facie case, the
employer must produce evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the firing or other adverse action.' For example, in
25. Id. at798.
26. Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703,703 (1995).
27. See 411 U.S. at 802; see also MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION
LAW 838-41 app. C (1988) (providing an example of a disparate treatment complaint).
28. I discuss a prima facie case in the context of the ADEA because that is the claim
brought in Reeves. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000).
The elements of a prima facie case may be different under a Title VII discriminatory hiring
claim, see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, or a discriminatory firing claim, see Elizabeth
Clack-Freeman, Comment, Title VII and Plaintiffs Replacement: A Prima Facie
Consideration?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 463, 470 & n.46 (1998) (discussing the various
interpretations of the fourth element of a prima facie case).
29. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. kL; 2 ROSSEIN, supra note 14, § 22.6[1], at 22-28.
33. "Preponderance of the evidence" is defined as: "[Ihe greater weight of the
evidence... [where] the jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the
stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note
9, at 1201.
34. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981) ("If the trier of fact
believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.").
A rebuttable presumption is justified because if a prima facie case is demonstrated, then the
most likely (and legitimate) reasons for terminating an employee are eliminated. See Gold,
supra note 4, at 184-85.
35. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
2001]
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McDonnell Douglas, the employer's reason for not hiring Green was
that he participated in unlawful conduct against the company. 6 This
supported assertion was enough to satisfy the employer's burden of
proof at stage two of the framework." Stage two also requires the
employer's articulated reasons to be clear and specific enough to give
the plaintiff a fair opportunity to respond under the final step of the
analysis.'
Upon hearing the clear and specific articulations for the employer's
conduct, the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show that the
employer's proffered reasons are false, and accordingly, pretextual In
other words, the plaintiff is allowed to produce evidence that the
employer's reasons for its action were merely a "coverup for a...
discriminatory decision."'  Proof of a coverup is powerful indirect
evidence of discrimination because "once the employer's justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation."'" Accordingly, if the plaintiff produces
compelling evidence of pretext, she has indirectly proven intentional
discrimination.42
Although relatively easy to state, the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas was rather skeletal. Specifically, ambiguities
remained with regard to the employer's evidentiary burden in step two,43
causing the Court to revisit the McDonnell Douglas framework within a
decade.
36. Id. at 803. Apparently, upon being laid off by McDonnell Douglas, Green
participated in a traffic "stall-in" and "lock-in" to protest "his discharge and the general
hiring practices of [McDonnell Douglas]." Id. at 794-95.
37. Id. at 806. Additional reasons given by employers include "lesser comparative
qualifications, inability to get along with supervisors or fellow employees, misconduct, [and]
business exigencies such as the need to eliminate jobs." 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra
note 14, at 21-22 & nn.75-78 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. For an example of an explanation that does not
meet this standard, see Robbins v. White-Wilson Med. Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th
Cir. 1981) (finding the employer's rejection of the applicant based on her "yucky" attitude
legally unsatisfactory).
39. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Pretext evidence may include evidence
that employees in a non-protected class were retained after committing similar acts for which
the plaintiff was allegedly fired. Id.; see also infra notes 148-51 on the plaintiff's evidence of
pretext in Reeves.
40. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
41. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 ("[Green] must be afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate that [his employer's] assigned reason for refusing to re-employ
was a pretext or discriminatory in its application.") (emphasis added).
43. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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B. United States Supreme Court "Refinement" of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework
1. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
As mentioned previously, to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of
discrimination, the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework
requires an employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its
action." However, in construing this portion, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit required an employer to prove its nondiscriminatory
reason by a preponderance of the evidence.4" This interpretation
effectively shifted the burden of persuasion to the employer after the
plaintiff articulated a prima facie case. 6  In order to clarify the
employer's evidentiary burden under step two of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the Supreme Court heard Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.47
In Burdine, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
imposition of the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Specifically,
the Court noted that the ultimate burden of persuasion "remains at all
times with the plaintiff."' The only burden that falls on the employer
under step two is a burden of production.49 Once the defendant
produces admissible evidence on the reasons for the adverse action, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.'
After the Court clarified the defendant's burden under step two of
the McDonnell Douglas framework, it proceeded to expound on the
utility of pretext evidence. The Court stated, in relevant part:
[The pretext] burden now merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
44. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Burdine v. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979);
Turner v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251,1255 (5th Cir. 1977).
46. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1981) ("It is plain
that the Court of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant the burden of
persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for preferring the chosen
applicant above the plaintiff.").
47. Id. at 252 & n.4.
48. Id. at 253.
49. Id. at 254. This "burden of production" is satisfied when the employer's proffered





persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.5
This excerpt, although rather straightforward and consistent with the
McDonnell Douglas holding,' created additional ambiguity on the
power of believable pretext evidence.5 ' Accordingly, while Burdine
apparently clarified the appropriate burden on the employer under step
two of the framework, it provided additional confusion on the
significance of pretext evidence.
The Supreme Court's brief discussion of pretext in Burdine spawned
a debate in the lower federal courts.' The circuit courts of appeals split
between two primary theories regarding the impact of pretext.55 The
first theory was known as the "permissive pretext-only" standard.5
Under this standard, if a plaintiff proved the defendant's reasons for its
action were pretextual, then "the trier of fact [was] permitted, but [was]
not compelled, to render judgment for the plaintiff. '"' Essentially, the
proof of pretext was a factor to consider when making the overall
determination of whether intentional discrimination exists, but the court
was not compelled to enter judgment for the plaintiff.58  In contrast,
other circuits interpreted Burdine to support the "pretext-only"
standard, which highly regarded believable pretext evidence. In those
circuits, when a plaintiff proved pretext beyond a preponderance of the
51. Id. at 256.
52. Compare id. with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (stating
persuasive evidence of pretext may be enough to warrant a judgment for the plaintiff).
53. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
54. Leland Ware, Inferring Intent From Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary
Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 37, 52 (2000); JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M.
STRICKER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 96 (4th ed. 1997) (conceding
that "Burdine's language left some doubt concerning how plaintiff's ultimate burden could be
satisfied when the plaintiff sought to discredit the employer's reasons. Should the plaintiff
win, as a matter of law, on a showing that the employer's reason was untrue?") (inner
quotations omitted).
55. See infra notes 58-59.
56. See Davis, supra note 26, at 715.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding proof
of pretext does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment); Benzies v. Ill. Dep't of
Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that
proof of pretext "is strong evidence of discriminatory intent, but it does not compel such an
inference as a matter of law").
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evidence, the court was required to rule for the plaintiff.9
2. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
In hopes of resolving the split between the permissive pretext and
pretext-only circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks.60 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit applied the pretext-only standard to Melvin Hicks's Title
VII claim.61 Accordingly, once Hicks proved that all the defendant's
reasons for its adverse action were pretextual, the Eighth Circuit
granted his motion for a judgment as a matter of law.62 The Supreme
Court, reversing, held that proof of pretext does not compel judgment
for a plaintiff because the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains
with the plaintiff.6
The Court reached this conclusion by carefully analyzing the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Specifically, the Hicks Court noted
that after the defendant met its burden of producing a legitimate, non
discriminatory reason for its adverse action, "the McDonnell Douglas
framework-with its presumptions and burdens-is no longer
relevant.""4 In other words, upon reaching step three of the framework,
the trier of fact is working tabula rasa. Accordingly, the Court argued
that the plaintiff's proof of pretext does nothing to compel the factfinder
because all of the presumptions are eliminated;6 all that is left is the
ultimate burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove intentional
59. See e.g., Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
if the plaintiff proves pretext, then they have satisfied the "ultimate burden" of proving
intentional discrimination); Tye v. Bd. of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811
F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985)
("If the plaintiff shows the defendant's proffered reason to be a pretext for race, the case is
over."). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The
Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57,
71-81 (1991) (discussing the pretext-only standard).
60. 509 U.S. 502, 512 (1993) ("[The courts of appeals'] divergent views concerning the
nature of the supposedly stable law in this Court are precisely what prompted us to take this
case .... ") (inner quotations omitted) (collecting conflicting cases).
61. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487,492 (8th Cir. 1992).
62. See id. ("Once [Hicks] proved all of [St. Mary's] proffered reasons for the adverse
employment actions to be pretextual, [Hicks] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
63. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 ("[The Court of Appeals' decision] disregards the
fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and
ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion.") (inner quotations omitted).
64. Id. at 510.




However, Hicks does not completely dismiss the significance of
pretextual evidence in the overall determination of intentional
discrimination. Specifically, in permissive pretext language, the Court
stated:
[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection
of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact
to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and ... no
additional proof of discrimination is required.6 7
This language was a clear endorsement of the permissive pretext
standard because proof of pretext will allow the factfinder to rule for the
plaintiff.6
Upon dismissing the pretext-only standard, the majority proceeded
to further "clarify" its position. However, when the majority attempted
to harmonize its holding with Burdine, it created more ambiguities and,
in fact, opened the door to yet another interpretation of the McDonnell
Douglas framework: the pretext-plus standard." Specifically, the Court,
while it construed the discussion of pretext in Burdine70 stated, "[A]
reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is
66. See id. at 514 ("We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer...
unless... [the] factfinder determines ... that the employer has unlawfully discriminated.").
67. Id. at 511 (footnote omitted) (inner quotations omitted); see also Davis, supra note
26, at 719 (arguing that the Hicks majority "adopted the permissive pretext approach").
68. See Ware, supra note 54, at 53.
69. Admittedly, the pretext-plus standard did exist before Hicks. See, e.g., Gailbraith v.
N. Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e are faced with a situation in which
proving that an employer's proffered reason for discharging an employee is a pretext does not
establish that it is pretext for racial discrimination."); Clark v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 717
F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that "[a] finding that the defendant did not truly rely
on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied instead on race,
will not suffice to establish Title VII liability"). However, the pretext-plus standard was
generally considered to be at odds with Burdine, and probably without true authority. See
Davis, supra note 26, at 714. In addition, many of the post-Hicks pretext-plus cases relied
primarily on Hicks for their application of pretext-plus. See, e.g., Bodenheimer v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The Court in St. Mary's put the issue to bed. To
prevail ultimately, the plaintiff must prove.., that the employer's reasons were not the true
reason for the employment decision and that unlawful discrimination was.").
70. The Hicks majority is construing Burdine's explanation that a plaintiff should have
the opportunity to prove that the employer's proffered reasons "were a pretext for
discrimination." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981).
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shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the
real reason.",71 Moreover, the Court added that, "the ultimate question
[is] discrimination vel non."'  The majority summarized its construction
of Burdine when it said that "[i]t is not enough.., to disbelieve the
employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of
intentional discrimination. 3
Thus, at the end of the majority's opinion in Hicks, the Court had
provided the following guidance to the lower courts by stating: (1)
pretext, by itself, may be enough to demonstrate intentional
discrimination;74 and (2) pretext is not enough by itself, rather proof of
intentional discrimination is required.75 What was left, the dissent puts
mildly, are "conflicting signals about the scope of [the majority's]
holding in this case.,
76
The primary purpose of reviewing Hicks is not to analyze the
correctness or incorrectness of the majority's decision.? Rather, the
purpose of discussing the opinion is to show the ambiguity created by
the majority's decision. Admittedly, Hicks did clarify that the pretext-
only standard was contrary to law. 8 However, by bifurcating the
opinion into two discrete holdings, the Court provided little guidance to
the lower courts on what standard they should apply in subsequent
cases.7" The Court seemingly endorsed the following two contrary
standards: (1) the permissive pretext standard, and (2) the pretext-plus
standard.' Thus, while one issue was resolved, the resolution created
71. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (inner quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 518 (alteration in original).
73. Id at 519.
74. See id. at 511.
75. See id. at 519.
76. Id. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77. If more analysis on the intricacies of Hicks is sought, several other student comments
do an excellent job of critiquing the decision. See, e.g., O'Dell, supra note 23; Clack-Freeman,
supra note 28.
78. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
79. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 28, at 485 ("Although the Court intended to clarify
what was required from the plaintiff once the burden has shifted back to the plaintiff,
[Hicks] ... created additional ambiguities for the lower courts."); LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 24 ("[Hicks] at best contains internal tensions; at worst,
portions of the majority opinion simply say inconsistent things."); see also Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537,541 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he opinion in St. Mary's is not easy
to analyze....").
80. See O'Dell, supra note 23, at 1267 ("[T]he majority's opinion can arguably be read to
support two alternate positions."); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 28, at 485 ("[T]he
[Hicks] Court seem[ed] to adopt the [pretext]-plus view .... ).
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further ambiguity.
C. The Road to Reeves: A Split as to Which Standard to Employ
While the Hicks decision was confusing on many different levels, the
greatest conflict came on the issue of summary judgment-how much
evidence must a plaintiff provide to survive an adverse ruling?8' From
the permissive pretext language in Hicks,' the majority of circuits held
that any factual dispute on the issue of pretext would negate the
imposition of summary judgment.' Alternatively, other courts
interpreted Hicks to require not only a genuine issue of fact on pretext,
but also additional evidence of discrimination to survive summary
judgment. "
1. Circuits Interpreting Hicks to Advocate the Permissive Pretext
Standard
A majority of the circuit courts of appeals interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Hicks to call for the application of the permissive
pretext standard.85 Under a permissive pretext standard, once the
81. See Ware, supra note 54, at 61 ("Hicks has caused a considerable amount of
confusion in summary judgment decisions."); EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 28
(Philip J. Pfeiffer ed., 3d ed. Supp. 2000).
82- See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
83. See Ware, supra note 54, at 61 (stating that a majority of courts interpreting Hicks
held that "[P]roof of pretext compels the denial of a defendant's summary judgment
motion"); FRIEDMAN & STRICKER, supra note 54, at 118.
84. See Ware, supra note 54, at 64-65 (citing Hidalgo v. Overseas Candado Ins.
Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 337 (1st Cir. 1997)); FRIEDMAN & STRICKER, supra note 54, at
118. The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, among others, believed this
additional evidence requirement required the plaintiff to produce direct evidence of
discrimination, and therefore contravenes the teachings of McDonnell Douglas. See Lawyers'
Committee Brief, supra note 5, at 14 & n.11.
85. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc) ("[W]e have understood Hicks to hold that the elements of [a] prima facie
case and disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons are the threshold findings, beyond
which the jury is permitted, but not required, to draw an inference... [of] intentional
discrimination."); Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337,347 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[P]receding
case-law of this circuit has interpreted the Hicks decision as creating a permissive inference of
discrimination following a rejection of the reasons offered by the defendant."); Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994); Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. of
Midwest, Inc., 79 F.3d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1996) (sustaining a jury verdict for plaintiff where a
prima facie case and jury's finding of pretext existed) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993)); Durham v. Xerox Corp. 18 F.3d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1994)
("Although a prima facie case combined with disproof of the employer's explanations does
not prove intentional discrimination as a matter of law, it may permit the factfinder to infer
intentional discrinination. ... ") (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511); Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
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plaintiff introduces evidence of a prima facie case and believable
evidence8 that the employer's articulated reasons are false, then the jury
is permitted to find for the plaintiff and the plaintiff should survive
summary judgment." For example, in Washington v. Garrett, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on Hicks, stated that "[i]f a
plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the
authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is
inappropriate."" Accordingly, that court rejected the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on Washington's racial discrimination
claim because "a genuine issue of fact" existed regarding the veracity of
the employer's explanation.! This approach, however, has not been
accepted by a minority of the United States Courts of Appeals.
2. Circuits Interpreting Hicks to Advocate the Pretext-Plus Standard
Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks warned that the majority's advocacy
for a pretext-plus standard "would result in summary judgment for the
employer in... many cases where the plaintiff has no evidence beyond
[a prima facie case] and [a] show[ing] that the employer's articulated
reasons are unworthy of credence."' ° This warning manifested itself in
some circuits where plaintiffs, in order to survive summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law, were required to prove not only a prima
facie case and pretext, but additional evidence of discriminatory intent.9'
106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e understand the Hicks Court to have been
unanimous that disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons, together with the prima facie
case, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of discrimination."); Barbour v.
Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("According to Hicks, a plaintiff need only
establish a prima facie case and introduce evidence [of pretext] ... at that point, the
factfinder... may infer discrimination."), cert. granted in par 516 U.S. 1086 (1996), and cert
dismissed, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996).
86. Hereinafter, when I discuss "believable" evidence of pretext, I mean evidence that
would allow a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer's explanation for its adverse
action was false-it does not have to be uncontroverted.
87. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; see also, e.g., Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1994) ("If a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the
authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is inappropriate, because it
is for the trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed."); Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1067
("[A] plaintiff may survive summary judgment... if the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's proffered reasons were not its
true reasons for the challenged employment action.").
88. Washington, 10 F.3d at 1433.
89. Id at 1434.
90. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. See infra notes 92-98. See generally Lanctot, supra note 59, at 81-91 (discussing the
implications of the pretext-plus standard).
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The Courts of Appeals for the First,9 Second, 93 Fourth,94 and Fifth
Circuits' applied the pretext-plus standard to their disparate treatment
cases. For example, additional evidence of discriminatory intent was
required by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
96
That court, in Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., articulated its
preferable standard: "To prevail ultimately, the plaintiff must prove...
that the employer's reasons were not the true reason for the
employment decision and that unlawful discrimination was." 97  In
addition, to survive summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit demanded
that: (1) a fact issue exist "as to whether each of the employer's stated
reasons was what actually motivated the employer" and (2) other
evidence appears to "create[] a reasonable inference that
[discrimination] was a determinative factor in the actions of which
plaintiff complains."98
Thus, the pre-Reeves climate is ambiguously clear: with two
conflicting standards established by the Supreme Court within one
majority decision,9 the courts of appeals were free to choose the
evidentiary standard they found most appropriate. Some courts applied
the permissive pretext standard; other courts applied the pretext-plus
standard. Accordingly, the split in the circuit courts was well
established, and it was simply a matter of time before the high court
again addressed the line of jurisprudence that originated in McDonnell
Douglas.
92. See, e.g., Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1994) ("To
[defeat summary judgment], the claimant must prove both that the employer's articulated
reason is false, and that discrimination was the actual reason for its employment action.")
(citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512 n.4); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.
1994).
93. See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
94. See, e.g., Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 1995).
95. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
96. See Davis, supra note 26, at 733; Ware, supra note 54, at 65.
97. 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Scales v. Slater, 181 F.3d
703,709 (5th Cir. 1999) ("To show pretext, a plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the
asserted reason was false and that discrimination was the actual motivation.") (emphasis
added) (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515); Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.
1998).
98. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Im. ATTEMPTED CLARITY: REEVES V. SANDERSON PLUMBING
PRODUCTS, INC.
The Supreme Court's latest attempt to clarify the McDonnell
Douglas evidentiary framework"°° took place in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.'0° However, consistent with the trend of the
Supreme Court's preceding opinions, Reeves's attempted clarification
resulted in continuing ambiguity.
A. Facts of Reeves
Sanderson Plumbing Products employed Roger Reeves, age fifty-
seven, in its toilet manufacturing facility for forty years." 2 Reeves
worked in the "Hinge Room" department where he was a supervisor for
the company's "regular line. '° As a supervisor, Reeves was responsible
for recording the attendance and hours of his workers, and reviewing
the weekly report of hours worked by each of the employees he
supervised."' In the summer of 1995, Reeves's supervisor, Russell
Caldwell, informed the director of manufacturing, Powe Chestnut, that
employees in the Hinge Room were frequently absent, tardy, or leaving
early. 5 A subsequent audit of the Hinge Room's timesheets detailed
"numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations on the part of...
Reeves.""' Consequently, in October 1995 Sanderson Plumbing fired
Reeves." Less than a year later, in June 1996, Reeves filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi,
alleging that he was fired because of his age" in violation of the
ADEA. 09
B. District Court Proceedings
In response to Reeves's suit, Sanderson Plumbing argued at trial that
100. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
101. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
102. Id at 137.
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id. at 137-38.
106. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam), rev'd, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
107. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138.
108. Id.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) (stating in relevant part that it is "unlawful for an
employer.., to discharge any individual.., because of such individual's age").
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it terminated Reeves because of his dereliction in regard to the
attendance records and time sheets.1 Reeves responded with evidence
that he "accurately recorded the attendance and hours of the employees
under his supervision, and that Chestnut [one of his superiors].., had
demonstrated age-based animus.. in his dealings with [Reeves]."112 The
case proceeded to a jury which decided in favor of Reeves and awarded
him $70,000.' The district court added $28,490.80 to the jury's award to
compensate Reeves for two years of lost income."4 Contemporaneously,
the district court denied Sanderson Plumbing's post-verdict motions for
judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial.1
C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Reverses
Sanderson Plumbing timely appealed the district court's denial of
the company's post-verdict relief. 6 The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam
decision, reversed and rendered judgment for Sanderson Plumbing.117
Even though the court applied a highly deferential standard,' it held
that Reeves had not introduced a sufficient amount of evidence to
sustain a finding of unlawful discrimination. 9 Nonetheless, the court of
appeals conceded that Reeves "very well may" have offered sufficient
evidence to prove that Sanderson Plumbing's explanation for Reeves's
firing was pretextualY This proof of pretext, however, was "not
dispositive" on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination."
In addition, the court of appeals dismissed Reeves's additional
evidence of discriminatory animus. In particular, the court noted that
Chestnut's derogatory comments were "not made in the direct context
of Reeves's termination." 22 Accordingly, "[b]ecause Reeves failed to
110. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138.
111. The "age-based animus" took the form of derogatory age-based comments directed
at Reeves, id at 151, and unequal treatment compared to younger employees, id. at 151-52.
112. Id. at 138 (footnote added).
113. Reeves, 197 F.3d at 691.
114. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 139.
115. Id
116. See Reeves, 197 F.3d at 691.
117. Id. at 694.
118. Id. at 691 ("[The district court] should be reversed only if there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that Sanderson discharged Reeves
because of his age.") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)) (inner quotations omitted).
119. Id. at 694.





offer evidence sufficient to prove both that [Sanderson Plumbing's]
reason [was] untrue and that age [was] what really triggered Reeves's
discharge," ' the Fifth Circuit vacated the jury's decision.124
D. The Supreme Court's Analysis and Decision
1. The Majority
Upon receiving the Fifth Circuit's adverse ruling, Reeves petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari.1" The Court granted certiorari to
resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals regarding standards
on the sufficiency of pretext evidence. 126 In its decision, the Court
addressed the following two interrelated issues: First, is a prima facie
case, coupled with believable proof of pretext, adequate to sustain a
jury's finding of intentional discrimination?"V Second, what standard
should a court employ when reviewing evidence under a motion for
judgment as a matter of law?12
On the first issue, Justice O'Connor noted that the Fifth Circuit's
pretext-plus standard had "misconceived the evidentiary burden borne
by [disparate treatment] plaintiffs."'29 The plaintiff's evidentiary burden
was clarified by the Court when it affirmatively endorsed the permissive
pretext standard: "[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is
false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated."' 30 The Court's endorsement of the permissive
standard was based on the probative value of pretext evidence:
believable pretext evidence, in many circumstances, would permit the
trier of fact to infer discriminatory intent.13 ' Thus, courts that required
123. IL at 692. Compare this pretext-plus language with the earlier Fifth Circuit
holdings. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 694.
125. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 528 U.S. 985 (1999) (granting
certiorari).
126. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,140 (2000).
127. Id
128. See id. at 149.
129. Id at 146.
130. Id at 148; see also Louis B. Kushner, et al., When Employment Discrimination
Cases go to the Jury, 15 LAW. J. 2, 13 (2000) ("[T]he [Reeves] Court laid [the permissive
pretext-only or pretext-plus] argument to rest by ruling that pretext-plus evidence is not
necessary.").
131. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("[The inference of discrimination] is consistent with the
general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
proof beyond a prima facie case and pretext ignored the value of pretext
evidence and unfairly burdened plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases.1
To relieve this burden, the Supreme Court effectively clarified that
lower courts were generally precluded from requiring additional
evidence beyond a prima facie case and believable pretext evidence to
sustain a finding of discrimination.133
The Court's "clarification" was, however, not without qualification.
Significantly, the opinion added that proof of pretext may not "always
be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability."" In some instances,
the Court argued, believable evidence of pretext may not create a jury
question on whether intentional discrimination occurred.135 In carving
out this exception, the majority retreated from its earlier advocacy on
the significance of pretext evidence.36 In particular, proof that the
employer lied about its reasons for termination does not necessarily
mean that discrimination is the "most likely alternative explanation."1 37
This exception, considered alongside the Court's general
endorsement of the permissive standard, created ambiguity in the
ultimate holding of the court-when will believable pretext evidence be
dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.") (inner quotations omitted).
Reeves's Brief submitted to the Court noted that this conclusion is a "hornbook principal."
See Petitioner's Brief at 27, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
(No. 99-536), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw/supreme-courtbriefs/99-53699-
536mol/brief/brief0l.html (last visited June 29,2001).
132. Cf. Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment
Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REv. 587, 653-54 (2000) ("The pretext-plus approach essentially
transformed the circumstantial evidence case into one requiring direct evidence of
discrimination.") (footnote omitted). The difficulty of producing direct evidence of
discrimination is well documented. See supra notes 5, 21-22 and accompanying text.
133. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148; see also Lawton, supra note 132, at 655 (noting that the
Reeves court rejected the pretext-plus standard); Kushner, supra note 130, at 13.
134. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
135. Id. Two examples are included in the majority opinion. The employer would be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if: (1) the record revealed an alternate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or (2) the plaintiff created a weak issue
of fact on pretext and there was "abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred." Id.
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. By creating this qualification, the Court
concedes that persuasive proof of pretext may still not be enough to infer discrimination.
Yet, the basis for the Court's rejection of the pretext-plus standard is the idea that once the
employer's proffered reason is shown to be false, "discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. Thus, Reeves contains an internal conflict
on the power of pretext evidence.
137. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. But see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577




enough to survive pretrial disposition? By neglecting to answer this
question," Reeves simply affirms the split that existed between the
circuits after Hicks: proof of pretext, along with a prima facie case, may
or may not be enough to survive summary judgment. To determine if
summary judgment is appropriate, Reeves invited courts to weigh the
validity and impact of admissible pretext evidence themselves,
particularly in summary judgment proceedings.139
By inviting lower courts to weigh the significance of pretext
evidence, Reeves encouraged what it expressly proscribed in the second
part of the opinion. In the second portion of the opinion, the Court
clarified the standard a court should apply when deciding a motion for
judgment as a matter of law."1 ° This clarification also applied to a court's
decision on a summary judgment motion, since "the standard for
granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a
matter of law.",
41
Initially, a court should "review all of the evidence in the record."''
Importantly, this standard affirmed that courts should consider both the
prima facie case and evidence of pretext when considering a dispositive
motion like summary judgment.43 While reviewing all of the evidence,
the court should "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party."'" In erring toward the nonmovant, courts should not
be so quick to dismiss the power of derogatory comments, even when
138. See Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Discrimination and Inequality
Emerging Issues Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194,
1212 (2000) ("Reeves appears to leave substantial latitude for lower courts to express their
skepticism toward allegations of discriminatory intent."). The Court briefly answered the
converse of this question. See supra note 135 for two examples of when pretext evidence will
not be enough to defeat judgment as a matter of law.
139. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (noting that summary judgment is contingent on whether a
"weak issue of fact" exists on the issue of pretext) (emphasis added); Kim Askew, Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (Is Pretext-Plus Really Gone?), in EMERGING ISSUES IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 465 (ALI-ABA ed. 2000); infra notes 258-61 and
accompanying text. But see Ware, supra note 54, at 63 ("If Reeves is properly interpreted by
lower courts it should resolve some of the confusion that has surrounded the plaintiff's
evidentiary burden at the summary judgment phase....") (emphasis added). "If," however,
proves to be the key word in Ware's conclusion.
140. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149-51.
141. Id at 150 (inner quotations omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 152 ("IT]he [court of appeals] disregarded critical evidence favorable to
petitioner-namely, the evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and undermining
respondent's nondiscriminatory explanation.").
144. Id. at 150.
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they are "not made in the direct context" of the adverse action.'
Moreover, Reeves cautioned that a reviewing court should avoid
weighing evidence and making credibility determinations.' 46 In addition,
a reviewing court should disregard all of the moving party's evidence
that is contradicted, impeached, or produced by interested witnesses.147
After it discussed the standards for pretext and review of a motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the Court analyzed the facts of Reeves's
claim. On the issue of pretext, the Court noted that Reeves made a
"substantial showing" that Sanderson Plumbing's proffered explanation
for the firing was false. 48 In response to Sanderson's contention that
Reeves had failed to maintain accurate attendance records, Reeves
offered evidence that his recording was proper. 49 Moreover, Reeves
presented evidence that showed there had never been any earlier
complaints about his record keeping, and that the company had not
reacted so harshly in similar situations of questionable accuracy."
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Reeves had produced a
sufficient level of pretext evidence for a reasonable juror to infer
intentional discrimination.15'
In addition to evidence of pretext, Reeves produced a significant
amount of other discriminatory evidence. According to the refined
standards for deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
court of appeals should have construed Powe Chestnut's (Reeves's
supervisor) age-based comments in a more favorable light. Those
comments, coupled with Reeves's prima facie case of age discrimination,
comprised a solid foundation of "age-based animus."s Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's judgment and upheld the
district court's decision to submit the case to a jury.
2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion focused on the majority's
145. Id. at 152.
146. Id. at 150-51 ("'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge."')
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986)).
147. See id. at 151.
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 144-45.
150. Id at 145.
151. Id. at 153-54.
152. Id at 152-153.
153. Id. at 153.
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imprecise exception to the general permissive pretext standard.'-4
Justice Ginsburg echoed the majority's advocacy for this general
permissive standard: "[T]he ultimate question of liability ordinarily
should not be taken from the jury once the plaintiff has introduced [a
prima facie case and believable evidence of pretext]."'55 However, the
concurrence conceded that additional evidence beyond these two
categories might be required to sustain a finding of intentional
discrimination. 56 This additional evidence requirement, Ginsburg
predicted, would probably be "uncommon."' s7  Nonetheless, Justice
Ginsburg sought a more precise explanation of situations where
additional evidence would be required.'
Justice Ginsburg's concern about the majority's confusing exception
to the permissive pretext rule foreshadowed the ambiguous legacy of
Reeves. And, like Justice Souter's prediction in Hicks regarding the
future of summary judgment under a pretext-plus regime,'59 Justice
Ginsburg's concerns quickly materialized.
IV. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF REEVES IN THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
By neglecting to clarify how much evidence is required to defeat an
employer's motion for summary judgment, Reeves has had a negligible
impact on the pre-Reeves circuit split. Two interpretations continue to
exist on the impact of believable pretext evidence. Courts subscribing to
the first interpretation have applied Reeves and held that a jury issue
existed when a prima facie case and credible evidence of pretext were
presented. This interpretation is the general holding of Reeves.'o On
the other hand, other courts have held that a prima facie case and
believable evidence of pretext did not create a jury issue of
discrimination. 16' This interpretation finds its basis in the exception to
the general Reeves holding. 2 These two interpretations are detailed in
154. See supra notes 134-35, 137 and accompanying text.
155. Reeves, 530 U S. at 155.
156. Id. at 154.
157. Id
158. Id.
159. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
160. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
161. See infra Part IV.B.
162. See Reeves, 530 U.S at 148 ("[T]here will be instances where... sufficient evidence




A. Courts Holding That a Prima Facie Case and Believable Evidence of
Pretext Create a Jury Issue
Most commentators and courts of appeals have interpreted Reeves
to hold that a prima facie case and credible evidence of pretext
demonstrates an issue of fact for the jury to resolve.'" In other words, if
conflicting evidence exists regarding the veracity of an employer's
reasons for its adverse action, a genuine issue arises as to the existence
of discrimination.'" This conclusion relies on the probative value of
pretext evidence-if an employer's reason is proven false, then
discrimination is the "most likely alternative explanation.'" The
following courts, in light of Reeves, have denied summary judgment to
the employer upon introduction of a prima facie case and admissible
evidence of pretext.
In Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that believable evidence of pretext, by itself, was
enough to create an issue of fact for the jury.'" Dale Ross was employed
by Campbell Soup as a sales merchandiser for the frozen foods
division.67 While employed at Campbell, Ross injured his back five
times by bending or lifting on the job.'" In October 1994 Ross was
terminated by Campbell. 169 In response, Ross filed suit claiming that
Campbell had discriminated against him based on his back disability, in
the action was discriminatory.").
163. See Ware, supra note 54, at 63 (interpreting Reeves to hold that "[w]hen [believable
pretext evidence] is identified at the summary judgment phase, the case should proceed to
trial"); McGinley, supra note 4, at 462 ("In Reeves, the unanimous Court made it clear that
only under unusual circumstances will it tolerate grants of summary judgment where the
plaintiff presents ... evidence of a prima facie case and that the defendant's explanation is
pretextual."); Stephen S. Rappoport, Employment Discrimination-Procedure: Reeves
Clarifies Aspects of Proving Job Bias But Poses Questions for Summary Judgment, 69
U.S.L.W. 2099, 2099 (2000) ("The presence of such [pretext] evidence almost certainly bars
the grant of summary judgment .... ). For cases supporting this interpretation, see infra
notes 166-191 and accompanying text.
164. See Ware, supra note 54, at 72 ("When the plaintiff has evidence which shows that
the employer's proffered justification is false there is, by definition, a 'genuine issue' since the
factfinder is permitted to infer discriminatory motive solely from the proof of pretext.").
165. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
166. See 237 F.3d 701,709 (6th Cir. 2001).
167. Id at 702.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 705.
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violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act." The district court
granted Campbell's motion for summary judgment on numerous
grounds. Ross appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of
summary judgment72
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by deciding whether Ross had
introduced a prima facie case of disability discrimination."3 One
component of this prima facie case was dependent on "the employer's
state of mind and how it thought Ross's back condition affected his
performance as an employee.1 74 To make these determinations, the
court reviewed Campbell's proffered reasons for terminating Ross and
any evidence of pretext.75 Upon a review of the record, the court of
appeals noted that Ross had produced some believable evidence of
pretext. 6  Accordingly, because of the inferential power of this
evidence,1" the court concluded that there was a "genuine issue of
material fact as to the company's state of mind during the events that
led to his firing." 78 Consequently, to defeat the employer's motion for
summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit required only believable evidence
of pretext.
Another circuit abiding by this permissive standard is the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. In Chuang v. University of California-Davis,
the court of appeals reversed the district court's approval of summary
judgment in favor of the University.179 Dr. Chuang was an assistant
professor of pharmacology at the University's School of Medicine."f
During his service to the University, Dr. Chuang believed that he was
being discriminated against based on his race (Asian) and national
origin (Chinese). 1 ' This prompted Chuang to file a Title VII claim
against the University alleging that it had (1) failed to "provide
170. Id. at 705-06 (citing ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
171. Id. at 705.
172. Id. at 710.
173. Id. at 708.
174. Id
175. Id. at 708.
176. Id. at 709.
177. The probative power of pretext is the basis for the court's denial of summary
judgment. Specifically, the court noted that the dispute as to the veracity of Campbell's
explanation "provides evidence as to the company's discriminatory intent in firing Ross." Id.
at 708.
178. Id at 709.
179. 225 F.3d 1115, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
180. id at 1120.
181. Id. at 1119.
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[Chuang] with a promised tenure position[;]" (2) forced Chuang to
relocate his laboratory during an ongoing research program; and (3)
neglected Chuang's complaints "regarding the misappropriation of some
of his research funds."18
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that "[a]s a general
matter, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need
produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer's motion
for summary judgment."' 3 Accordingly, the court found that Dr.
Chuang had asserted a prima facie case on two of his three independent
assertions." The University responded with "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its [adverse] actions." In response, the
court moved to an analysis of Dr. Chuang's evidence of pretext.1 6
In considering pretext evidence, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
general holding of Reeves: "[A] disparate treatment plaintiff can survive
summary judgment" by producing a prima facie case and evidence that
the employer's explanation is false.' In this case, the court applied
Chuang's prima facie evidence to rebut the University's explanation for
its action." In drawing all reasonable inferences toward Chuang,1" the
court decided that Chuang had produced sufficient evidence to create a
fact issue on pretext.?°  Consequently, summary judgment was
misapplied in the district court."'
In addition to the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, other courts have denied
summary judgment when believable pretext evidence is introduced." In
182- Id.
183. Id. at 1124.
184. Id. at 1124-26. The court determined that there was no prima facie evidence on the
claim of misappropriating research funds. Id. at 1126.
185. Id. at 1126.
186. Id. at 1127.
187. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)).
188. Id
189. See id. (noting that Chuang is the only full-time faculty member in the department
without tenure and also the only member that is non-Caucasian).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1130.
192. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 854 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[A]
prima facie case and evidence of pretext raises a sufficient inference of discrimination to
entitle a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment."); Toth v. Gates Rubber Co.,
No. 99-1017, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14374, at *25 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000) (finding
contradictory evidence on the issue of pretext was enough to defeat summary judgment);
Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2000) (ruling that
indirect evidence of pretext was enough to infer intentional discrimination and overcome the
defendant's judgment as a matter of law); Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231
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doing so, these courts refused to weigh the evidence and drew all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. 9 Thus, courts that
deny summary judgment upon admission of a prima facie case and
believable evidence of pretext have not contradicted the evidentiary
standards articulated in Reeves."9 This contradiction, however, is not
easily avoided in the remaining circuit courts of appeals.
B. Courts Holding That a Prima Facie Case and Believable Evidence of
Pretext Do Not Create a Jury Issue
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has refused
to subscribe to the general holding of Reeves.95 Instead, the First Circuit
has embraced the exception to that holding and, accordingly, has
carefully dissected plaintiff's evidence of pretext to ensure that it is
supported by a discriminatory conclusion.' This plaintiff-hostile
framework is well demonstrated in Feliciano v. El Conquistador Resort
& Country Club.w
Feliciano de la Cruz filed a Title VII claim accusing the El
Conquistador Resort of firing her based on her Puerto Rican national
origin. "' Before her firing, Feliciano"9 was the resort's credit manager
for thirteen months. ° After working at the resort for six months, El
Conquistador increased Feliciano's salary by $4,000 and three days
before being fired, the resort's president gave her a commendation
F.3d 821, 831-32 (11th Cir. 2000) (reversing summary judgment for high school principal who
produced believable pretext evidence); Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 98-6043, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11978, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2000) (precluding summary judgment
against plaintiff if believable pretext evidence is produced).
193. See, e.g., Anderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11978, at *16; Ross v. Campbell Soup
Co., 237 F3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court that "drew evidentiary
conclusions in favor of [the movant]").
194. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion on the exception to the general holding of Reeves, see supra notes
134-35, 137.
197. 218 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2000). It is important to note that the above rendered judgment
was issued six days before Reeves. Compare id. with Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133. However, after
the Reeves opinion was issued, Feliciano petitioned the First Circuit for a rehearing; she
claimed the court's opinion was inconsistent with Reeves. Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 9. Feliciano's
petition was denied because the First Circuit claimed that its June 6 opinion was wholly
"consistent" with Reeves. Id at 10. Thus, it is fair to say that the court's initial decision is an
example of the First Circuit's interpretation of Reeves.
198. Id. at 4.
199. I have omitted "de la Cruz" from the plaintiff's last name to remain consistent with
the First Circuit's opinion. Id. at 1-10.
200. Id. at 4.
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letter.2O' Despite these offerings, Feliciano was "abruptly terminated"
and replaced with a woman from the Philippines.' Soon after,
Feliciano initiated the Title VII suit against her former employer.
In the district court, El Conquistador's motion for summary
judgment was granted .2' The district court concluded that Feliciano had
failed to produce any material facts "directed toward proving an animus
of discrimination on the basis of national origin. "204 Feliciano appealed
and the First Circuit affirmed summary judgment for El Conquistador. 2 0
Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the First Circuit
found that a prima facie case of discrimination existed."' In response, El
Conquistador offered a non discriminatory explanation: Feliciano's
firing was related to her incompetence as the resort's credit manager.'
This explanation, according to the court, was enough to satisfy El
Conquistador's burden of production. With that burden satisfied, the
McDonnell Douglas framework disappeared, leaving the ultimate
burden of persuasion with Feliciano.2
To satisfy her burden of persuasion, Feliciano offered evidence that
El Conquistador's explanation for her discharge was pretextual."' To
show that she was competent, Feliciano argued that the financial
problems at the hotel were not related to her performance. 1 In
addition, Feliciano argued that her salary raise and commendation letter
were inconsistent with El Conquistador's allegations of incompetence.2
El Conquistador countered that the raise and commendation letter were
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 9.
206. Ik- at 5. For a national origin prima facie case, the First Circuit required the
plaintiff to prove the following: (1) that she is in a protected class; (2) she was qualified for,
and performed the job at a satisfactory level; (3) she was dismissed; and (4) after being
terminated, she was replaced by someone with equivalent qualifications to perform similar
work. Id.
207. Id. at 6.
208. Id.
209. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993).
210. See Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 7.
211. Id. at 7. ("According to Feliciano, the hotel's financial problems were caused by an
inexperienced and improperly trained hotel staff, a bug in the computer system, a failure of
the finance department to obtain spec sheets for... timely billing, and a failure to provide




routine and not based on Feliciano's performance.2 3 Moreover, El
Conquistador disputed Feliciano's excuses for the poor financial status
of the resort.
21
In its analysis, the First Circuit acknowledged that it would have to
"weigh all the circumstantial evidence of discrimination, including the
strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case and the employer's proffered
reasons for its action."2 '5  The court began this task by evaluating
Feliciano's pretext evidence and it concluded that "a reasonable trier of
fact could find that El Conquistador did not believe that Feliciano's job
performance was unsatisfactory, and hence fired her for some other
reason."
216
This finding, however, was not enough for Feliciano to survive
summary judgment. The court held that this believable evidence of
pretext does not "shed any light" on the true reason for Feliciano's
firing.217  Instead, Feliciano's pretext evidence only showed the
"unfair[ness]" of El Conquistador's decision.218 Thus, despite a genuine
issue of fact regarding pretext, summary judgment was affirmed for El
Conquistador.
219
Other courts have also upheld the application of summary judgment
when a genuine issue of fact existed regarding the truthfulness of an
employer's explanation. In Schnabel v. Abramson, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had introduced
enough evidence to allow a reasonable juror to "conclude that the stated
reasons for discharging the plaintiff were a pretext." M Nonetheless, the
court refused to allow the inference of discrimination from this
persuasive evidence of pretext.2  Consequently, the Second Circuit
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer."
Other United States Courts of Appeals have adopted the Reeves
exception as law within their circuit.'m Interestingly, these courts have
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
217. IM.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 9. ("Under such circumstances, summary judgment is proper.").
220. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000).
221. See id. ("[P]laintiff has not demonstrated that the asserted pretextual reasons were
intended to mask age discrimination.").
222. Id. at 91.
223. See Rubinstein v. Adm'rs. of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir.
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found that a material issue of fact existed as to the legitimacy of the
employer's justification for its adverse action.=4 Nonetheless, the same
courts have refused to deny the employer's summary judgment motion
because there was not a jury issue on the ultimate question of
discrimination.' However, as the following section illustrates, that
logic, in addition to being faulty, contravenes well-established standards
that govern evidentiary review during summary judgment.
V. THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF PRETEXT: WHY SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IS IMPROPER WHEN BELIEVABLE PRETEXT EVIDENCE IS ADMITTED
The post-Reeves disparate treatment environment is alarmingly
similar to the pre-Reeves uncertainty. The question that spawned
Reeves lingers without a clear answer-how much evidence must a
plaintiff introduce to survive summary judgment? "6 In attempting to
answer this question, Reeves noted that a prima facie case, in addition to
believable evidence of pretext, may or may not defeat summary
judgment. 7 A definite answer is contingent on the weight and
persuasiveness of the pretextual evidence.' This amorphous standard
has perpetuated uncertainty in the disposition of disparate treatment
2000) (noting that there was some evidence of pretext in addition to derogatory remarks, but
not enough to survive summary judgment); James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 157 (2d
Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for the employer despite prima facie evidence and
additional evidence that "would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [the
employer's] explanation.., is false"); Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 58 (2d Cir.
2000) (Cardamorre, J., dissenting) (dissenting based on majority's failure to realize material
issue of fact on pretext evidence); Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of IMI., 226 F.3d 922, 925-
26 (7th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that jury could have come up with alternate conclusion, but
still affirming judgment as a matter of law for the defendant); Calvin v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
218 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bataillon, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (arguing that material
dispute as to pretext evidence should have precluded summary judgment); see also Marullo v.
Ellerbe Becket, Inc., No. 95-CV-4561, 2001 WL 282772, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001)
(declining to accept Magistrate's recommendation because the plaintiff failed to
"demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact... as to both the falsity of the
stated reason and the likelihood of discriminatory motive") (emphasis added).
224. See, e.g., Massey, 226 F.3d at 926 ("[Tjhe jury might have disbelieved everything
[the employer] said .... ); James, 233 F.3d at 157 (finding issue of fact regarding veracity of
employer's proffered reason).
225. See, e.g., Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d
1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that evidence of pretext "does not shed any light" on what was
the true reason for the adverse action).
226. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
227. Compare notes 130-133 and accompanying text with notes 134-138 and
accompanying text.
228. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
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claims.29 To resolve this uncertainty, a uniform standard is required.'
This standard should be based on the policies underlying the McDonnell
Douglas formulation and summary judgment procedure.
The majority standard,"1 which requires denial of an employer's
summary judgment motion when a prima facie case and believable
evidence of pretext are established, promotes the policies underlying the
McDonnell Douglas framework and summary judgment procedure. For
instance, it is clear that the McDonnell Douglas framework relies on
inferences that can be made from circumstantial evidence7m The most
fundamental of these inferences allows a factfinder, upon a showing that
an employer's explanation is false, to deduce that discrimination was the
"actual reason for [the employer's] decision."" Courts have upheld this
inference as a "reasonabl[e]" conclusion based on a "general principle
of evidence law."23
In accordance with principles of summary judgment procedure, this
reasonable inference of discrimination must be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff"s during adverse summary judgment proceedings.' 6 In other
words, if a plaintiff demonstrates a "genuine issue as to any material
fact '" 7 on the falsity of an employer's explanation, the reasonable
inference from pretext creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
229. See discussion supra Part IV.
230. Cf. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1568, 1602 (1996) ("The entire area of shifting burdens is replete with confusion, and
guidance is needed desperately.").
231. See supra Part IV.A.
232. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
233. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; see Ware, supra note 54, at 71; Michael J. Hayes, Has
Wright Line Gone Wrong? Why Pretext can be Sufficient to Prove Discrimination Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 65 MO. L. REV. 883, 951 (2000) ("[W]hen a party raises a false
motive for its actions, it is logical to infer that the party is seeking to conceal an unlawful
motive."); see also Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966)
(noting that, in union-affiliated discrimination suits, "[ilf [the trier of fact] finds that the stated
motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another motive. More than
that, he can infer that the motive is one that the employer desires to conceal-an unlawful
motive .... ").
234. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
235. I align nonmovant with the plaintiff and movant with the defendant in this context
because that is generally the posture of the parties in disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., iL
at 139; cf Ware, supra note 54, at 49-50 & n.111 ("Employers began to prevail on summary
judgment with greater frequency.").
236. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986).
237. This phrase is the standard for determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. If a "genuine issue as to any material fact" exists,
summary judgment is inappropriate. Id.
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intentional discrimination.238 If such a genuine issue exists, summary
judgment against the plaintiff is inappropriate and the case should
proceed to a jury.2
Despite this logical blend of discriminatory inferences and summary
judgment procedure, some courts have not drawn "all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party" when considering
pretextual evidence.24° For example, in Feliciano, the First Circuit
recognized that there was a jury question on the issue of whether the
employer's justification was false.24' Nonetheless, the court concluded
that this showing of pretext "[did] not shed any light on what [the] true
reason for firing [Feliciano] was." '42 From that conclusion, it is apparent
that the Feliciano court did not recognize the reasonable inference from
the evidence of pretext that discrimination was the true reason for
Feliciano's firing. 43 Instead, by requiring additional evidence to
establish a nexus between pretext and discrimination, the First Circuit
"essentially ignore[d]" the policies underlying the McDonnell Douglas
framework and summary judgment procedure. 244
In contrast, courts that deny an employer's summary judgment
motion when believable evidence of pretext is introduced have
embraced McDonnell Douglas's inferences as well as summary
judgment standards.2 4'  These courts have recognized the reasonable
238. Ware, supra note 54, at 72 ("When the plaintiff has evidence which shows that the
employer's proffered justification is false, there is, by definition, a 'genuine issue' since the
factfinder is permitted to infer a discriminatory motive solely from proof of pretext.").
239. Id. at 73. Empirical examples of this approach are discussed at supra Part IV.A.
240. Ware, supra note 54, at 71-72; see, e.g., Malacara v. City of Madison, 224 F.3d 727,
733 (7th Cir. 2000) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority had ignored evidence
favorable to the plaintiff, including the prima facie case and pretext evidence); Falcon v. Trs.
of the State Colls. in Colo., No. 99-1318, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14338, at *14 (10th Cir. June
19, 2000) (refusing, in light of Reeves, to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Falcon on
issues of derogatory remarks and pretext).
241. Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2000) ("Feliciano's explanations of her job performance problems generated a triable
issue of pretext.").
242. Id. at 8; see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (arguing that
despite a jury issue of pretext, the plaintiff "has not demonstrated that the asserted pretextual
reasons were intended to mask age discrimination").
243. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000).
244. O'Dell, supra note 23, at 1281-82; see also 1 LARSON, supra note 5, §8.05[2], at 8-85
("To grant summary judgment [for the defendant upon a showing of pretext] would...
remove any chance that a jury might have had to infer discriminatory intent ... ").
245. See PERRITr, supra note 9, § 6.06[A], at 360 ("If McDonnell Douglas is viewed
as... permitting an inference of discriminatory intent to be drawn from this [pretextual]
evidence, there is no reason to require the plaintiff to adduce additional evidence once the
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inference that pretext evidence allows. 6 Accordingly, during summary
judgment, courts subscribing to the majority standard have recognized
that a genuine issue of pretext implies a genuine issue of
discrimination.47  This inferential correlation precludes summary
judgment in favor of the employer.
In addition to upholding the inferential policies underlying the
McDonnell Douglas framework, courts that apply the majority standard
uphold policies underlying summary judgment procedure. Specifically,
from the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have
recognized the importance of having juries try issues of motive and
intent. 8 For instance, in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
the Supreme Court warned that "summary procedures should be used
sparingly in ... litigation where motive and intent play leading roles."249
Motive and intent are key inquiries in disparate treatment cases."O
Accordingly, Poller teaches that imposition of summary judgment
should be used sparingly when applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework.
The reasoning of Poller is preserved by the standard advocated in
this article. This standard, instead of requiring additional evidence of
discrimination to survive summary judgment,"" minimizes the burden on
the plaintiff by requiring just enough evidence to create a jury issue on
the veracity of the employer's explanations.2 In contrast, courts
requiring evidence beyond pretext render plaintiffs' survival of summary
employer's explanation is shown to be pretextual.").
246. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48; Ware, supra note 54, at 72.
247. See supra Part IV.A.
248. See Ware, supra note 54, at 69-70; see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Acr OF 1972, at 1720 (1972), microformed on CIS No. 72-
S542-28 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (statement of Congressman Ervin) (advocating that juries should
decide questions of fact that arise under discriminatory lawsuits).
249. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Admittedly, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has warned that Poller is not applicable under contemporary summary
judgment analysis. See Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). However, Poller has not been expressly overruled by the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, juries are better equipped to determine intent issues in the
workplace because they "are immersed in the workaday world; they know how offices and
factories operate, and bring to their evaluations of the evidence a common sense rooted in the
experience of their everyday lives." Lawyers' Committee Brief, supra note 5, at 27.
250. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
MODJESKA, supra note 15, § 1.6, at 15.
251. See supra Part VI.B.
252. See Chuang v. Univ. of Calif.-Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
the plaintiffs should bear a small burden at summary judgment; accordingly, all that was
required was a genuine issue of fact on the employer's proffered reasons).
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judgment more difficult."3 This outcome is at odds with the Court's
hesitancy to approve summary judgment in lawsuits where motive and
intent are the key inquiries.'
Another policy underlying application of summary judgment
recognizes a prohibition on "weigh[ing] the evidence." 5  This
prohibition emanates from the idea that "weighing... the evidence...
[is a] jury function[], not... [a function] of a judge."2 This principle
demands a standard that requires only a prima facie case and believable
evidence of pretext. Specifically, once the plaintiff produces enough
evidence of pretext to create a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment
should invariably be denied. 7  A reviewing court does not have to
determine if the plaintiff's evidence is "weak" or inconclusive in order
to determine if summary judgment is appropriate.' Thus, the standard
advocated here avoids contravening the prohibition against weighing the
evidence.
Weighing the evidence during summary judgment proceedings is
inevitable upon application of a standard that scrutinizes pretextual
evidence to determine if the ultimate burden of proving discrimination
is satisfied. 9 Under that standard, additional evidence will be required
if the plaintiff merely creates a "weak" issue of pretext. ° To determine
if the evidence is weak or strong, a court will have to weigh the
pretextual evidence at the summary judgment stage.
For example, in Feliciano, the panel justified summary judgment
against the plaintiff by noting that the pretextual evidence was "thin"
and unpersuasive.26 In order to reach that conclusion, however, the
court had to "weigh all the circumstantial evidence of discrimination,"
253. See O'Dell, supra note 23, at 1280.
254. Poller, 368 U.S. at 473; Ware, supra note 54, at 69-71 (summarizing the policy of
summary judgment when issues of motive and intent are presented).
255. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
256. Id (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986)).
257. See, e.g., Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
that summary judgment is improper when pretextual evidence, which allows an inference of
discrimination, is presented); supra note 192 and accompanying text.
258. This is the inquiry that Reeves encouraged courts to make before deciding if
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
148.
259. This is the minority standard that is embraced by courts that rely on the exception
in Reeves. See supra part IV.B for a survey of courts that have applied this standard.
260. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148; Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country
Club, 218 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) (requiring a "weigh[ing]" of the evidence before
determining of summary judgment is proper).
261. Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 10 (1st Cir. 2000).
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including the plaintiff's pretextual evidence.' This activity, however,
expressly contravened well-established principles underlying summary
judgment.
From the analysis above, it is clear that the standard employed by a
majority of the circuit courts of appeals furthers the policies underlying
the McDonnell Douglas framework and summary judgment procedure.
These courts, by requiring only a genuine issue of fact on the employer's
advanced explanation, have upheld the inferential value of pretextual
evidence and avoided contravention of well-established summary
judgment principles. In contrast, courts that have continued to
scrutinize believable evidence of pretext failed to realize the probative
value of pretext, and consequently ignored fundamental standards of
summary judgment. This imprecise practice should be eradicated in
disparate treatment lawsuits.
VI. CONCLUSION
The McDonnell Douglas framework is the primary mechanism
courts employ to analyze indirect evidence of discrimination in disparate
treatment cases. The framework's frequent application, however, has
been compromised by pervasive uncertainties. Admittedly, the
Supreme Court has attempted to clarify these uncertainties. However,
the Court has generally created additional confusion by its
"clarification." In its latest attempt to clarify, the Court simply leftimportant questions unanswered and continued to recognize
diametrically opposed interpretations of pretextual evidence.
In Reeves, the Court attempted to clarify the pretext-plus versus
permissive pretext debate. In its amorphous holding, the Court created
additional uncertainty as to the probative value of pretext evidence.
Consequently, two interpretations of Reeves have developed in the
lower federal courts. One of these interpretations, subscribing to an
exception in Reeves, invites lower courts to contradict well-established
principles of evidentiary review. This contradiction is avoided by the
262. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
263. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (forbidding courts from "weigh[ing] the evidence").
* The author would like to thank his family and friends for their love and support
throughout law school, especially Sarah whose patience and love has been incomparable. In
addition, the author thanks Attorney Lisa Paul for the idea to write on this topic. Hopefully
this piece will aid those attorneys striving to represent those who have truly faced workplace
discrimination. Finally, the author would like to thank his former teachers and mentors
including Professor William Miller, Dr. David Krause, Professor J. Gordon Hylton, and
Professor Joseph D. Kearney.
2001]
316 MARQUETTE LAW RE VIEW [85:283
second interpretation of Reeves that regards pretext evidence as a
powerful enough indicator of intentional discrimination to survive
summary judgment.
However, the coexistence of these interpretations will probably
invite another instance of Supreme Court clarification. When that
opportunity arises, the Supreme Court should try to settle the post-
Reeves debate by adopting a standard that automatically recognizes a
jury issue when a prima facie case and believable evidence of pretext are
produced. In reality, however, the Court is likely to perpetuate the
ambiguous legacy of its McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence.
DAVID J. TUREK*
